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Disabling constitutionalism. 
Can the politics of  the Belgian 
Constitution be explained?
Maurice Adams*
For the second time in just a few years, Belgium recently faced a profound political and 
institutional crisis. Since constitutions are the ultimate means of  building and sus-
taining a just and stable politico-institutional order, these crises raise the question of  
what role the constitution plays in channeling and/or constraining the political state of  
affairs. This is a most pressing topic, especially since the dominant theory about why 
and how countries such as Belgium are able to function as stable polities also claims to 
be indicative of  the democratic quality of  these countries. In this article, it is submit-
ted that the Belgian case can indeed be instructive in telling us a bit more about the 
constitutional conditions that are, if  nothing else, at least not antagonistic to societal 
stability. The thesis proposed in this article is that for creating a stable society, there 
should be a connection between what is called negative and positive constitutionalism 
(S. Holmes): not only should a constitution disable political decision-making by build-
ing procedural roadblocks or by enacting bills of  rights (negative constitutionalism); 
it can also help create the very demos which governs itself  through the constitutional 
regime by including incentives for politicians to cooperate (positive constitutionalism). 
The Belgian Constitution has failed in connecting these types of  constitutionalism. And 
since partition and secession, which might be the result of  all this, usually come with 
an array of  negative consequences (the possibility of  violence being one of  them), this 
is a problematic state of  affairs.
* V-Fund Professor of  Democratic Governance and Rule of  Law, and Professor of  General Jurisprudence 
at Tilburg Law School (the Netherlands). Visiting professor at both Antwerp and Leuven Universities 
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Connecticut School of  Law), Donald Horowitz (Duke Law School), Patricia Popelier (University of  
Antwerp), and to Thije Adams for advice and comments regarding this article. Earlier versions of  this 
article were discussed during conferences and seminars in Bangkok, the Hague and Tilburg. Also thanks 
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1. Introduction
The title of  this article is a testimony to the challenge that every academic active in the 
domain of  Belgian public law has to face from time to time. Sooner or later, he or she will 
be confronted with questions about Belgian politics and its accompanying constitutional 
state of  affairs. One question stands out prominently, and it has a tendency of  leaving 
only bewilderment in the eyes of  those raising it. It seems to point to a rather unusual 
situation, namely: “How does it work?” Explaining Belgian political and constitutional 
particulars and vicissitudes is no easy task at the best of  times, and a foreign readership 
in particular would likely not see the forest for the trees. We are dealing with a very com-
plex society, divided in many respects: linguistically, ideologically, culturally, regionally, 
economically, etc. These divisions are politically highly relevant and come with a complex 
constitutional design. “No country but Belgium offers so many job opportunities to law-
yers specialising in constitutional law,” the Belgian Prime Minister Elio di Ruppo recently 
asserted during a presentation on a new treatise of  constitutional law.1
In going back to the aforementioned bewilderment for a moment, one could observe 
that recently it has significantly amplified. This is due to the fact that for the second 
time in just a few years, the country has faced profound political and institutional cri-
ses. The most recent crisis resulted in Belgium not having even a federal government 
for 541 (!) days2—a world record, apparently. Therefore, the issue is no longer merely 
“How does Belgian politics function?,” but also “Does it function at all?”
This last question is of  particular constitutional significance. Since constitutions are 
the ultimate means of  building and sustaining a just political order, the Belgian crises 
just mentioned are also instructive as to whether or not the constitution, in reality, 
possesses independent or normative value: to what extent is the Belgian Constitution 
capable of  governing the dynamics of  the political power process? What role, if  any, 
does it still play in channeling and/or constraining the political state of  affairs?
These seem to me to be most pressing questions, especially since some theories 
about why and how countries such as Belgium are able to function as stable polities, 
also claim to be indicative of  the democratic quality of  the state it is meant to fit.3 
Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that its political and constitutional ups and downs 
sometimes have a surrealistic quality about them (René Magritte was Belgian!4), the 
Belgian case can be relevant outside Belgium. Although every political and constitu-
tional order is in some sense unique, trying to explain this uniqueness might well serve 
broader theory-building from the beginning.5 In any case, the question of  how divided 
societies can build and sustain a just political order is one of  the great questions of  our 
1 Quoted in newspaper De Standaard, Feb. 27 2012.
2 From Apr. 26, 2010. The new federal government was installed on Dec. 6, 2011. The government forma-
tion process of  2007 took 194 days.
3 I am hinting here at Arend Lijphart’s theory. See Section 4 of  this article.
4 Sophia Powers, René Margritte, The Art Story, www.theartstory.org/artist-magritte-rene.htm.
5 Cf. Mark Tushnet, The Continuing Significance of  ‘Country Studies’ in Comparative Constitutional Law, Paper 
presented at the World Congress of  the International Association of  Constitutional Law, Mexico City, Dec. 
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time,6 and here I will deal with how this is attempted in Belgium and what role, if  any, 
the constitution has to play in this.7
I will divide this article into five main sections: Section 2 will describe the constitu-
tional and accompanying institutional organization of  Belgium; Section 3 will sketch 
the historical roots of  its current constitutional and institutional design; Section 4 will 
outline the more specific political drives behind this design; and Section 5 will ana-
lyze and evaluate the Belgian politico-societal developments currently challenging the 
country’s institutional set-up and constitutional shape. Before submitting some final 
observations in Section 7, I will deal with the question of  what all of  the preceding 
means for the state of  constitutionalism and democracy in Belgium (Section 6). By 
approaching the topic of  this article in this way, I hope to bring some order into what 
at first sight may seem like sheer chaos.
The approach taken here builds on both law and political science. Lawyers are used 
to studying constitutions as legal phenomena, and political scientists, if  they do so at 
all, study constitutions as social phenomena. In this article I aim to integrate these 
two disciplines.8 “[K]nowledge of  the constitutional text alone equate[s], [not] even 
nearly, to an understanding of  political reality,” some colleagues wrote a few years 
ago. “[B]ut”, they added, “it is a necessary condition of  that understanding.”9 I think 
this indicates reciprocity, and what we should pay attention to is how political reality 
and constitutional law inform and influence each other. In Sections 5 and 6 some space 
will be devoted to this reciprocity.
2. Constitutional and institutional layout —“warehouse” 
federalism and a blocked constitution10
Belgium today has some 10.6 million inhabitants; it is a small and affluent country 
and is organized around two dominant languages and cultural communities (demoi): 
6 Cf. Kris Deschouwer, The PoliTics of Belgium. governing a DiviDeD socieTy 242 (2009); Richard Pildes, The 
Legal Structure of  Democracy, in The oxforD comPanion To law anD PoliTics 332 (Keith Whittington et al. 
eds., 2008). The absence of  Belgium as a case study in many a volume on constitutional design and 
change seems to me a missed opportunity from the perspective of  theory building. Recently this was 
for example the case in consTiTuTional Design for DiviDeD socieTies. inTegraTion or accommoDaTion? (Sujit 
Choudhry ed., 2008); and how consTiTuTions change. a comParaTive sTuDy (Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro 
eds., 2011). Belgium indeed is a Fundgrube for developing ideas about how to sustain a just political order 
and about regulating societal conflict.
7 As may be inferred from the above, this article will specifically address those constitutional norms that 
concern the institutions and organization of  the Belgian state and the rules of  the political game. Of  
course, a democratic constitution also significantly contains civil rights. That is why I want to make it 
clear at this early point that the topic of  this article does not preclude that I will pay attention to this other 
dimension of  a constitution, although mainly as far as language rights are concerned.
8 Cf. Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland, Comparative Law in Constitutional Contexts, in Comparative Law. 
A Handbook 313, 322–323 (Esin Örücü & David Nelken eds., 2006).
9 samuel e. finer, vernon BogDanor & BernarD ruDDen, comParing consTiTuTions 5 (1995).
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the Dutch-speaking part in the north (called Flanders, with a population of  some 6.1 
million people, referred to as Flemings), and the French-speaking part in the south 
(called Wallonia, making up 55 percent of  the land in the country and with 3.4 mil-
lion residents known as Walloons). A language border, officially marked by the leg-
islator in 1962–1963 and entrenched in 1970 in Article 4 of  the Constitution,11 
separates the two communities, and has resulted in a rigid division of  the country 
into linguistic areas. The fact that within such an area a language is recognized as the 
main official language means that it is also the language of  administration, govern-
ment, education, and justice. As a result, Dutch is the official language in the north, 
and French in the south. However, Brussels, with some 1.1 million inhabitants, has 
been constitutionally recognized as a bilingual area—Dutch- and French-speaking—
but has a predominantly francophone population.12 In effect, some 60 percent of  the 
Belgian population are Dutch speakers and some 40 percent are French speakers. 
Constitutional recognition has also been granted to a small German-speaking part of  
the country (bordering Germany and with some 75,000 inhabitants).
In addition, there are a limited number of  municipalities —situated on the language 
border and also bordering the so-called Brussels-Capital Region (see below)— where a 
substantial number of  Dutch- and French-speaking people reside and where language 
facilities are granted to those who speak the officially recognized “minority” language, 
i.e., the language that is not the official language.13 These minorities can use the lan-
guage of  their choice in matters relating to, e.g., administration, schooling of  children 
(6–12 years old), and justice. These municipalities are called “facility municipalities” 
and are also obliged to communicate with the citizens in the language of  the “minor-
ity” language speakers’ choice. So, too, do all forms and official communications have 
to be available in―depending on the language area in which a municipality is situ-
ated― either Dutch and French, or German and French. However, in communications 
between such a municipality, on the one hand, and the regional or federal authorities 
to which the municipality resorts, on the other hand, the official language is the norm, 
as this deals with communications within the municipal administration itself. In other 
words, language facilities are a service for the citizens and not for the administration. 
To avoid any misunderstandings: individual linguistic liberty is protected by Article 
11 Since in the context of  this article this is a telling constitutional provision, I quote the text in full:
  Belgium comprises four linguistic regions: the Dutch-speaking region, the French-speaking region, the 
bilingual region of  Brussels-Capital and the German-speaking region. Each municipality of  the Kingdom 
forms part of  one of  these linguistic regions. The boundaries of  the four linguistic regions can only be 
changed or corrected by a law passed by a majority of  the votes cast in each linguistic group in each House, 
on condition that a majority of  the members of  each group is present and provided that the total number 
of  votes in favor that are cast in the two linguistic groups is equal to at least two thirds of  the votes cast.
12 Historically, Brussels was a Dutch-speaking city. Nowadays, during office hours, with many Flemish com-
muters coming to work there, it is a bilingual city. For more on Brussels, see Section 5.
13 Which in practice might well be the majority language (linguistic borders have been entrenched on the 
basis of  a decades old language count!). Where, for example, French is not the official language, this does 
not rule out the possibility that sometimes the majority of  the population in these municipalities are first 
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30 of  the Constitution (and has been since 1831 when Belgium was established as an 
independent state), and the aforementioned arrangements are only applicable to the 
relation between the citizens and the state; the choice of  language used in private and 
social life, including commercial activities, is in principle free.
Belgium, as Article 1 of  the Constitution has stated since 1993, “is a federal state 
composed of  Communities and Regions.” Belgian federalism is organized, as is clear 
from this provision, on the basis of  a double subdivision into Communities and 
Regions,14 each having its own legislative and executive jurisdiction. By way of  sev-
eral state reforms,15 since 1970, there has been a progressive transfer of  powers from 
the federal level to these Communities and Regions. Between these Communities and 
Regions, on the one hand, and the federal level, on the other, there is no legislative 
hierarchy; all can enact legislation, for which they are exclusively competent, and all 
legislation enacted by the Communities and Regions is on a par with federal legislation.
There are three constitutionally recognized Communities, of  which the so-called 
Flemish and French Communities are the most prominent ones. There is also a small 
German-speaking Community in the eastern part of  the country. The Communities 
are mainly competent in relation to specific subject matters of  cultural concern to the 
respective Dutch, French, and German-speaking populations in Belgium. However, 
they also have exclusive jurisdiction over what are termed personal matters: certain 
aspects of  healthcare, family policy, education, and so on. This jurisdiction is territori-
ally defined: it stops at the language border.16 For example, the Flemish Community 
is not competent in the French Community. The situation in Brussels, however, is an 
exception to the territorial rule. There, the Flemish Community has competence in 
matters with regard to the Dutch-speaking residents, and the French Community with 
regard to the French-speaking ones. By way of  example: it is the Flemish Community 
that has competence with respect to schools in Brussels that teach in Dutch, and the 
French Community with respect to schools that teach in French.
Belgium is further divided into three Regions: the Flemish, the Walloon, and the 
Brussels-Capital Regions. These Regions are mainly and exclusively competent in cer-
tain economic matters in their respective areas: environment, agriculture, energy, 
employment policy, public transport, international cooperation related to these com-
petences, area development and planning, etc. There is no German Region; it is the 
Walloon Region that has competence in the German-speaking part of  Belgium.
14 In the remainder of  this article I use capitals whenever I refer to these officially recognized Communities 
and Regions and their competences. When these capitals are not used I refer to the non-official, i.e., col-
loquial, meaning of  the words.
15 Five in all: 1970, 1980, 1988–1989, 1993, and 2001. At the time of  this article’s composition there was 
agreement on a sixth state reform, but it had yet partly to be laid down in legislation and implemented. 
Suggestions for a seventh state reform pop up in the media already.
16 Although there still is political disagreement on the issue of  territorial competence: some French-
speaking politicians claim that the competences of  the Communities are personally rather than terri-
torially defined. This would imply that the French Community would be competent with respect to the 
French-speaking population of  Flanders. There is, however, an authoritative line of  case law by the 
Belgian Cour constitutionnelle as well as the Conseil d’État that confirms the principle of  territoriality in 
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Complementing this federalized structure, the federal government and bicameral 
federal parliament have decision-making powers extending across the whole country, 
especially concerning issues that are not expressly left to the Regions or Communities. 
So, although the Regions and Communities have significant competences, federal 
institutions retain a fair share of  power. Key issues like social security, police, immi-
gration, foreign policy, justice and fiscal policy are still, to a large extent, in the hands 
of  the federal government and parliament.
Graphically, the situation is presented in Figure 1.
The federal government depends on a majority in parliament; Belgium is thus a 
parliamentary democracy (as well as a—mainly ceremonial—monarchy). In fed-
eral parliament, which has competence with respect of  the federal constitution (the 
term is a tad deceptive, as it is in fact the only one in the federation17), there is a clear 
Figure 1. The Communities and Regions of  Belgium.
Source: www.eea.europa.eu.
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Dutch-speaking majority: 62 of  the members of  the Chamber of  Representatives 
belong to the French-speaking language group, while 88 belong to the Dutch-speaking 
language group; in the Senate the numbers are 29 and 44 respectively. From a quan-
titative point of  view, Dutch-speaking members of  parliament could impose their will 
on the minority of  francophone parliamentarians. In reality, of  course, things are not 
quite that simple in a federation whose main organizational principle is language. Not 
only has in the Federal Council of  Ministers since 1970 linguistic parity been manda-
tory (Article 99 Constitution), but also decisions that concern the organization of  the 
state have to be made by a two-thirds majority in federal parliament, as well as by a 
majority in each of  the two language groups in this parliament (the requirement is 
described in art. 4 of  the Constitution and referred to throughout the Constitution). 
Interestingly enough, this can be done without constitutional amendment, but by so-
called “special legislation”; it is a technique that is prescribed for most Belgian insti-
tutional reforms. So, while a two-thirds majority can change the Constitution after 
a complicated and lengthy procedure, institutional reform must meet even stricter 
demands, even if  such reform follows a “regular” legislative procedure, i.e., a proce-
dure that doesn’t require change of  the Constitution as such. Consequently, institu-
tional reforms are impossible without a special majority in federal parliament, and 
31 members of  the federal Chamber of  Representatives or 15 members of  the federal 
Senate can block them. In other words, an institutional reform can never be achieved 
against the will of  a majority in one of  the language groups, even if  this majority is 
representative of  a minority in Belgium (as is the case of  the French-speaking lan-
guage group in federal parliament).
Moreover, whenever a 75 percent majority of  one of  these language groups in one 
of  the chambers of  federal parliament declares that the relations between the different 
communities in Belgium risk deteriorating as a result of  a federal legislative proposal 
(as long as they are not dealing with budgets and do not concern laws requiring a 
special majority), the legislative procedure will be postponed (art. 54 Constitution). 
This is known as the alarm bell procedure, and the idea behind it is to prevent one of  
the language groups in federal parliament from pushing through a legislative pro-
posal against the will of  the other language group in parliament. When the alarm 
bell procedure is raised, the Council of  Federal Ministers, which is composed on the 
basis of  linguistic parity, must then, within 30 days, advise parliament on the issue 
concerned. As can be readily imagined, such a procedure puts enormous pressure on 
the federal government; if  it cannot come to an agreement, it will almost certainly fall, 
with representatives of  the two language groups subsequently having to negotiate a 
new government on a subject about which there is fundamental disagreement. Thus, 
the alarm bell procedure has a preventive or dissuasive quality and the political factions 
in parliament will not easily raise the alarm.18
18 This alarm bell mechanism exists next to the so-called conflict of  interests procedure, which is applicable 
between the different entities of  the Belgian federal state. More specifically, it can be called upon when the 
profession of  competences by one of  the parliaments of  the Communities, Regions or Federation is believed 
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There are, moreover, three highest courts: the Cour de cassation (in civil and crimi-
nal matters), the Conseil d’État (in administrative matters), and the Cour constitution-
nelle (in constitutional matters). The Cour constitutionnelle deserves special mention 
here because its establishment was the result of  Belgium’s transition, in the 1970s 
and 1980s, from a unitary to a federal state. This ultimately resulted in the introduc-
tion of  judicial constitutional review, initially only to resolve conflicts of  competence 
between the different levels of  government. As indicated earlier, there is no hierarchy 
of  legislative instruments enacted by the various entities of  the Belgian state, and this 
may cause conflicts of  competence between the Communities/Regions and the federal 
state. To resolve such conflicts, it was felt that a constitutional court was needed, since 
leaving this task to the parliaments would make Belgium ungovernable. Instead of  
assigning this role to the existing courts, the initiators of  a constitutional amendment 
of  1980 chose to set up a special court, at the time called the Cour d’Arbitrage (Court 
of  Arbitration). This court would adjudicate disputes between the various legislatures 
of  the federal Belgian state.19 The then Cour d’Arbitrage (which was, and still is, com-
posed of  twelve members, on the basis of  linguistic parity) could thus check whether 
legislation introduced by the federal state, the Communities or the Regions was in line 
with the competences assigned to them.20
It might be worth mentioning here that the demise of  the federal government in 
2007 was the direct result of  a decision by the Cour constitiuonnelle on a highly sen-
sitive issue: the constituency of  Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV), which for the federal 
elections comprised the central bilingual district of  Brussels and some neighboring 
parts of  Dutch-speaking Flanders (which, in fact, is home to many French-speaking 
Belgians), together containing some 1.6 million inhabitants. It has been an exception-
ally—and politically—difficult topic for decades. In 2003, the Cour constitutionnelle 
as laid down in art. 143 of  the Constitution). When, after consultations between the different entities no 
solution for the conflict can be reached, the case is sent to a “consultation committee,” composed of  12 
members of  the federal, Regional and Community governments, which has to find an agreement. If  it does 
not, the issue is tabled again in the assembly where it was first dealt with (after which another assembly 
might initiate the conflict of  interests procedure again). This procedure can delay a legislative procedure for 
quite some time. A similar procedure exists for conflicts of  interest between the different governments.
  Of  course, since this procedure concerns the different autonomous entities of  the Belgian federal state, 
the political consequences are not necessarily as drastic when compared to the alarm bell procedure 
(which, as we saw, deals within one and the same level of  the Belgian federal state): the continued exis-
tence of  any of  the governments is not dependent on a political majority in a parliament to which it does 
not have to pay responsibility to.
19 For more on this, see Patrick Peeters, Expanding Constitutional Review by the Belgian “Court of  Arbitration”, 
11 Eur. Pub. L. 475, 475–479 (2005).
20 Since 1989, the Court has also been competent to determine whether the right to equal treatment, the 
right not to be discriminated against, and the right to freedom of  education have been violated (encap-
sulated in arts. 10, 11, and 24 of  the Belgian Constitution, respectively). In 2003, the Belgian constitu-
tional legislature decided to extend the review powers of  the Court of  Arbitration to include, especially, 
all the rights and freedoms listed in Title II of  the Belgian Constitution (On Belgians and Their Rights) and 
to a number of  other constitutional provisions. Finally, in 2007, the Court’s name was changed to Cour 
constitutionnelle (Grondwettelijk hof in Dutch, Verfassungsgerichtshof in German). On these reforms, see 
Maurice Adams & Gerhard van der Schyff, Political Theory Put to the Test: Comparative Law and the Origins 
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ruled that, following a 2002 electoral reform, which was the result of  a hard-fought 
political compromise, this constituency contravened the equality and non-discrimi-
nation clauses of  the Constitution. It was the only constituency in the country that 
did not coincide with a single monolingual province. As a result of  this 2002 reform, 
voters in parts of  Flanders could vote for French-speaking politicians. The Cour consti-
tutionnelle declared unconstitutional parts of  the law concerning this compromise,21 
also stating that a solution for this situation had to be reached before the 2007 federal 
elections. A solution, however, was not reached, and the contention made the post-
election coalition negotiations very difficult.
In November 2007, the Dutch-speaking members of  parliament almost unani-
mously voted to split up the constituency. This was the first time ever that a single 
language group did so in view of  such a sensitive issue, which put a lot of  pressure on 
the relations between the different language groups. The dire prospect of  the conflicts 
of  interest22 and alarm bell23 procedures loomed largely, and the “conflict of  interest” 
procedure was actually resorted to. This caused considerable delay in resolving the 
issue. In 2010, the government fell again, before agreement on this topic between the 
different political factions was reached.24
What may not be immediately obvious to outsiders is to what extent difficulties sur-
rounding this electoral district have to do with territorial-linguistic claims. Due to the 
constituency’s hybrid nature, the Dutch-speaking Flemish political parties wanted it 
to be split, which would create two separate electoral districts: one for the Brussels 
Region and one district for the Province of  Flemish Brabant. This would prevent the 
francophone political parties from attracting French-speaking voters outside of  bilin-
gual Brussels and put a brake on the “Francization” of  parts of  Flanders (especially in 
the municipalities surrounding Brussels), something so greatly feared by the Flemish.
This is a highly sensitive issue in Belgian politics and society. Brussels has, over 
the centuries, developed from a Dutch-speaking city into a French-language enclave 
in Flanders. The legislative fixation in 1962–1963 of  the language border (which 
was based on the language census of  1947), was meant to stop the Francization of  
Brussels and its surrounding area. The border was not to be based on language census 
anymore. The granting of  linguistic facilities and rights to the French-speaking popu-
lation in some municipalities was to compensate for this. The Francization, however, 
didn’t stop, resulting today in French-speaking majorities in officially Dutch-speaking 
municipalities. The debate, as it unfolds today, is partly put in terms of  whether or not 
21 Judgment 73/2003 of  May 26, 2003, available in Dutch, French, and German at www.const-court.
be/public. See Dave Sinardet, From Consociational Consciousness to Majoritarian Myth: Consociational 
Democracy, Multi-level Politics and the Case of  Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde, 45 acTa PoliTica 346 (2010); and 
Servaas Lindemans, Het probleem Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde. Analyse van een staatsrechtelijke doos van Pandora 
[The problem Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde. Analysis of  a constitutional Pandora’s box], Jura falconis 473 
(2005–2006).
22 See Peeters, supra note 19, and supra text accompanying note 18.
23 See supra text accompanying note 18.
24 All this raises the question whether the 2007 and 2010 elections in the aforementioned constituency 
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the language facilities were introduced as a temporary measure to give the French-
speaking population the opportunity to learn to speak Dutch (a measure which, many 
Dutch speakers say, has been to no avail) or as some sort of  fundamental right which 
almost by definition cannot be temporal (as many of  the French speakers claim).
In sum, Belgium can, on the one hand, be characterized by what might be called 
“warehouse federalism”: a polity in which the different constituent parts of  the state 
are competent in different matters, sometimes even within the same geographical area 
(i.e., Brussels). On the other hand, Belgium’s layout is also characterized by a blocked 
constitution, i.e., a constitution on the basis of  which a minority can freeze any deci-
sion concerning institutional and constitutional reform. As far as state reforms and 
related matters are concerned, it is almost as if  the majority is structurally in a minor-
ity position; it is a constitutional paradox.25 Today, all this makes for eight parliaments 
and eight governments,26 on top of  ten provinces, a constitutional court, and two 
Kings (and three Queens actually).
3. How it has all come about: a very short socio-political 
history
As we have seen, even a fairly succinct description of  the institutional organization 
of  Belgium opens up a very complex multi-layered—“byzantine”—constitutional and 
institutional layout. How has it come about?27
After the Napoleonic wars, the United Kingdom of  the Netherlands was established 
in the Low Countries in 1815. This Kingdom encompassed both the northern prov-
inces that nowadays constitute the Netherlands, and the southern provinces that 
nowadays constitute Belgium. Support for the policies of  the first monarch of  the 
United Kingdom, King William I, was far less strong in the south than it was in the 
25 Jan Velaers, De crisis van de staat en de achillespees van het staatsrecht [The crisis of  the state and the achilles 
heel of  constitutional law], rechTsKunDig weeKBlaD (2011–2012), at 24.
26 Each government comes with a parliament. The parliaments are: Federal Parliament (which is the only 
one with two chambers); Flemish Parliament (for both the Flemish Region and Community); Parliament 
of  the Walloon Region; Parliament of  the French Community; Parliament of  the German-Speaking 
Community; Parliament of  the Brussels-Capital Region; Combined Assembly of  the Common Community 
Commission; Assembly of  the French Community Commission; and Assembly of  the Flemish Community 
Commission. The last four parliaments/assemblies are composed of  the same people, each time exert-
ing other competences. Depending on the definition of  parliament, the count may differ from the one 
given here. Vuye, for example, refers to nine parliaments, counting Federal Parliament, because of  its two 
Chambers, double. See Hendrik Vuye, België: een Staat in hervorming of  in ontbinding? [Belgium: a State 
in reform or in corruption?], ars aequi 719 (2008). To avoid making matters even more complex, I will 
disregard the ten provinces (each of  which also has an assembly) and the 589 Belgian municipalities.
27 It is impossible here to give anything more than a very rough sketch of  Belgian socio-political history. 
For details see, e.g., Herman Van Goethem, Belgium—Challenging the Concept of  a National Social Security. 
A  Short History of  National Partition, in social feDeralism: The creaTion of a layereD welfare sTaTe: The 
Belgian case 21 (Bea Cantillon et al. eds., 2011); herman van goeThem, Belgium anD The monarchy. from 
naTional inDePenDence To naTional DisinTegraTion (2010) (in this paragraph I strongly build on these two 
publications); Deschouwer, supra note 6, at 16–40. See also els wiTTe eT al., PoliTieKe geschieDenis van België. 
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north. In the south, Roman Catholics and liberals pursued greater liberty in shap-
ing their own identities. The Roman Catholics sought freedom of  religion from the 
Protestant north, while the liberals wanted better representation: southern underrep-
resentation in the States General, i.e., the parliament based in the northern provinces, 
was indeed acutely felt by many in the region. In addition, the francophone population 
found it hard to stomach William’s Dutch-language politics.
Matters eventually came to a head when in 1830 the pursuit of  liberty sparked 
a revolution, and the southern part of  the country seceded from the northern part. 
A provisional government was formed, and shortly afterwards a National Congress 
was elected. The Congress then drafted and, in 1831, promulgated, a very liberal, for 
its time, Constitution.28 The result was what might be called a bourgeois state, which 
excluded a large number of  its citizens from passive and active voting rights. Due to 
the previous Napoleonic occupation, these developments were largely, though not 
exclusively, French in influence. The resulting state was francophone in spirit, and as 
it happened, the poorer part of  the fledgling country’s population was Flemish and 
Dutch-speaking. Dutch was considered to be the language of  “common” people, while 
French was the language of  high culture and refinement; French language dominated 
cultural, administrative, judicial, and economic life, as well as higher education.
A Flemish nationalist movement took shape in the nineteenth century as a result of  
at least three factors: (i) the influence of  the Romantic movement, which greatly val-
ued language, identity, tradition, and popular culture; (ii) the support of  the Roman 
Catholic Church to the preservation of  the Dutch language (Flanders was almost 100 
percent Catholic, while in Wallonia, with its tangible French revolutionary influence, 
there was a strong anticlerical movement); and (iii) the threat of  French annexation 
of  Belgium. This last factor strengthened the desire to resist francophone influence, 
and for this reason, even the French-speaking King Leopold I supported the develop-
ment of  the Dutch language.29 As a result, in the nineteenth century, Flemish senti-
ment transformed into Flemish activism, and legislation was enacted that recognized 
the use of  Dutch as one of  the official languages of  communication in local adminis-
tration as well as the judiciary. Such a measure presupposed bilingualism in civil ser-
vants, which effectively put the Walloon population at a disadvantage, since Walloons 
were (and are) largely monolingual.
Belgium, like its northern neighbor the Netherlands, has only ever had a single 
constitution since its founding. The amendments this constitution has undergone, 
through the course of  the country’s history, have, however, been substantial. These 
changes chiefly reflect the kingdom’s social segmentation and linguistic diversity. 
What is important to note here is that the Belgian state could only exist as an unquali-
fied unitary nation state within the framework created by the tax-based electoral 
28 A careful analysis of  the various influences on the Belgian Constitution can be found in Jean Gilissen, Die 
belgische Verfassung von 1831. Ihr Ursprung und Einfluss [The Belgian Constitutution of  1831. Its Origin 
and Influence], in BeiTräge zur DeuTschen unD Belgischen verfassungsgeschichTe im 19. JahrhunDerT 38 (Werner 
Conze ed., 1967).
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system, introduced by the 1831 Constitution:30 as voting power was in the hands of  
a wealthy French-speaking elite, electoral clout and “capital” for the most part coin-
cided. The “language question,” as it was called, however, soon cast its shadow on all 
manner of  struggles, such as those involving identity, class, economic development, 
and religion. When in 1893 the masses of  Dutch-only Flemings were democratically 
and politically empowered for the first time—they were given the vote (although not 
yet universally, and with qualifications)—they began to realize more than ever before 
that with language division came socio-economic inequality.31 And they also realized 
that it was language discrimination that perpetuated the social divide. In the years to 
follow, more language rights were granted to the Flemish people. As a result of  the 
gradual introduction of  universal suffrage and of  other electoral reforms (in particu-
lar, proportional representation, which allowed the Catholic and Socialist parties to 
dominate the political scene in the Walloon and Flemish parts of  the country, respect- 
ively), regional monolingualism was legislatively recognized. For example, Dutch 
became the language of  academic education at Ghent University in 1930, as well as 
of  primary and secondary education (from 1932); also linguistic areas were defined, 
albeit initially in a flexible manner and in the context of  administrative affairs (1921 
and 1932). The development of  universal suffrage acted as a catalyst for constitutional 
change in this respect, and for undermining the unitary Belgian state.
In this way, the language question gradually also gained an institutionalized iden-
tity. And it also developed into an emotional battlefield, building on the inherent social 
tensions within the Belgian state. Its scope was broadened by the accompanying socio-
economic cleavage between the different communities. The conflict over language was 
as much a socio-economic struggle as it was a struggle for the institutional recog-
nition of  territorially defined identity.32 After the Second World War, Flanders devel-
oped quite rapidly economically, while, at the same time, there was a steady decline of  
Walloon industry, and the locus of  economic power was transferred to the northern 
Dutch-speaking part of  the country—a development that has stimulated Flemish con-
sciousness and political power, but that has simultaneously invigorated the Walloon 
movement (by now the underdog!) and has fueled discontent between the two regions.
4. Political theory and culture
Although written law, especially the Constitution and special legislation, describes the 
official structures and procedures within which the main Belgian political institutions 
and its actors are supposed to function, it does not of  course fully cover the actual 
30 van goeThem, supra note 27, at 251 et seq.
31 Id.
32 van goeThem, supra note 27, at 25. I am not going into the question of  whether or not either Flemish, 
Walloon or Belgian identity is historically accurate or merely a construct. What is important is that it is 
real to many. Van Goethem in this context talks about an “imagined community”; a fiction which can 
develop into a reality, especially when it is given shape within a framework of  concrete institutions, ritu-
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decision-making processes.33 It is therefore important to deal with Belgian political 
culture, and clarify its relationship to the constitutional design (see Section 2), that is 
representative of it.
The political scientist Arend Lijphart has famously stated that what is remarkable 
about Belgium is “not that it is a culturally divided society . . . but that its cultural 
communities coexist peacefully and democratically. What is more, Belgium can legiti-
mately claim to be the most thorough example of  a consociational democracy, the type 
of  democracy that is most suitable for deeply divided societies.”34 A  consociational 
democracy can usually be found in socially, and possibly ethnically, divided or seg-
mented societies. Whereas it was previously thought that a stable democracy could 
not exist in such societies, Lijphart has tried to show that this is not necessarily true. 
Consociational theory teaches us that segmentation raises the stakes of  politics higher 
than they would be in a homogenous society, since segmentation is a potentially desta-
bilizing force. Conducting politics as a zero-sum game is risky business, and the repre-
sentatives of  the different segments in society therefore actively strive for cooperation, 
consensus, and stability: they seek to find each other and to cherish common ground 
as much as possible. Political differences between the ruling groups are, as a result, not 
politicized or exaggerated and a substantial number of  the political leaders cooperate 
in governing the country. A pragmatic political elite, organized into political parties, 
seeks to solve societal and political problems in such a way that all factions concerned 
can more or less accept the outcome of  the political game, thus neutralizing destabi-
lizing tendencies. This also prevents major political groups from becoming estranged 
from the political system. As a result, although political decision-making in consocia-
tional democracies is strongly affected by the interplay of  past and present political 
and other tensions, in practice, so the theory goes, it operates in a way that defuses 
these tensions and encourages compromise.35
To generate widespread acceptance, a consociational democracy should ideally 
have four characteristics: a grand governing coalition (or power-sharing executive 
structure among relevant political groups); proportionality (not just in elections, but 
also in cabinets, parliament, the civil service, the media, advisory organs, etc.); mutual 
vetoes (decisions can only be taken with mutual consent); and segmental autonomy 
(each social segment has its own sphere of  authority, either territorial and/or func-
tional, which allows sensitive issues to be taken off  the national agenda).
In Belgium, even before 1970, the year in which the nation’s linguistic division was 
constitutionally entrenched and the process of  federalization started, there were clear 
elements of  consociationalism, predominantly on matters of  what might be called 
33 Xavier Mabille, Political Decision-making, in moDern Belgium 201, 201 (René Bryssinck & Michel Boudart 
eds., 1990).
34 Arend Lijphart, The Belgian Example of  Cultural Coexistence in Comparative Perspective, in conflicT anD 
coexisTence in Belgium. The Dynamics of a culTurally DiviDeD socieTy 1, 1 (Arend Lijphart ed., 1981) (empha-
sis added). See also arenD liJPharT, Democracy in Plural socieTies. a  comParaTive exPloraTion 223–238 
(1977); and arenD liJPharT, PaTTerns of Democracy. governmenT forms anD Performance in ThirTy-six 
counTries 243–310 (1999).
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confessional/ideological and socio-economic concern, but not so much on matters 
of  language divide.36 Consociationalism mainly manifested itself  as “pillarization.”37 
A pillarized society is vertically divided into several segments or “pillars” that repre-
sent different allegiances. In Belgium, this manifests as Catholics against socialists 
and liberals in the case of  confessional issues (and all that comes with it) and social-
ists against liberals in the case of  socio-economic issues (the Catholics being split on 
this).38 The three main political segments (liberals, Christian democrats, and social-
ists), which date back to the mid-nineteenth century, were reflected not only in politi-
cal parties, but also in social organization. These segments enjoyed a certain amount 
of  self-rule, especially concerning the just mentioned ideological fault line, which, as a 
result, gave more salience to the linguistic tensions in the country.39 In any case, ideo-
logical and socio-economic segmentation has strongly permeated virtually all socio-
economic and religious institutions in the country. Thus, outside the strictly political 
framework, but mostly in close contact with it, there is a whole range of  social org- 
anizations that reflect the various ideological and socio-economic divisions in Belgium 
and that possess a measure of  autonomy in organizing their sphere of  activity: there 
were and still are Catholic, socialist, and liberal trade unions, and Catholic and (neu-
tral) state schools, hospitals, universities, etc. And although the societal differences 
on which these organizations were built, especially the confessional/ideological one, 
have eroded, the grip they have on the government, parliament, and public adminis-
tration is still considerable. Socio-economic policies and the organization of  the wel-
fare state continue, to a large extent, to devolve into the deeply institutionalized pillar 
organizations.40
Nevertheless, it was only after the “pacification” of  the regional-linguistic divide in 
1970—the date, as we saw, of  the institutionalization of  the language divide in the 
Constitution—that Belgium could develop into a near-split country,41 with the linguis-
tic and accompanying socio-economic divisions as its main driving force. At first, the 
Regions and Communities were only granted cultural autonomy, as it was believed 
that such “light” competences could not endanger national unity. Over the years, 
however, in the wake of  subsequent state reforms, regional autonomy has grown. The 
Belgian state has further federalized, and the Regions and Communities have gained 
competences in many matters; consociationalism in Belgium today is therefore quali-
fied in that it has coincided with federalization. As a result there is, it is fair to say, 
a double protection of  minorities: by way of  institutionalizing these protections in 
36 Deschouwer, supra note 6, at 4–9.
37 The term, from the Dutch “verzuiling,” was as far as I can trace introduced in this context by Lucien 
Huyse, Pillarization Reconsidered, 19 acTa PoliTica 145 (1984).
38 See Wilfried Swenden & Maarten Theo Jans, “Will It Stay of  Will It Go?” Federalism and the Sustainability of  
Belgium, 29 West Eur. Pol. 877, 878 (2006).
39 Cf. Lucien Huyse, Political Conflict in Bicultural Belgium, in conflicT anD coexisTence in Belgium, supra note 
34, at 107–126.
40 Deschouwer, supra note 6, at 8.
41 Liesbet Hooghe, Belgium: Hollowing the Center, in feDeralism, uniTarism anD TerriTorial cleavages 55, 71 
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the Constitution at the federal level, and by way of  granting autonomy to linguistic 
groups (including minority groups) through federalization.42 For Flemish nationalists, 
this double protection of  the French-speaking minority is a major source of  frustra-
tion, and this again has boosted Flemish identity and calls for more Flemish autonomy.
The contemporary constitutional and institutional structures of  Belgium, as set 
out in Section 2 of  this article, can indeed be understood from the point of  view of  
consociationalism: federal government coalitions usually have a fairly broad support 
base with a minimum of  three coalition partners (and often more), and it is clear that 
changes in the country’s institutional set-up cannot possibly be decided by a simple 
majority in parliament; there are many institutionalized mechanisms in place to 
reach (or force!) political consensus or pacification on these issues. For this reason, 
Pinder has defined consociational arrangements as “institutions and procedures that 
encourage consensus rather than allowing the will of  those who represent a simple 
majority of  the population to prevail.”43 Majority-type democracy, from this point of  
view, is “the antithesis of  consociational democracy.”44
One specific aspect of  Belgian politics should finally be stressed here, namely the 
important role political parties and elites play in the political system and in society. 
Compromise-mindedness is a necessity, but not, as we will see in the next section, an 
easy requisite for political decision-making in a divided society like Belgium. Due to 
the complicated nature of  reaching political compromises, the political elite mostly 
makes choices in secretive negotiations. Political parties also tend to control the allo-
cations of  positions and policy choices in government, as well as the appointment of  
many officials. They have, moreover, been able to maintain this prominent position 
by allocating public resources to themselves by legislative means (party financing 
mechanisms).45
5. Trouble in consociational paradise: two fault lines
Does Belgium’s constitutional layout promote societal consensus and stability? 
The short answer to this question is that its track record is not optimal: constitu-
tional design in Belgium, as much as it fosters cooperation, structurally hinders 
42 This double protection is also strongly criticized in Flemish legal and political academic doctrine. See, e.g., 
recently sTefan soTTiaux, De verenigDe sTaTen van Belgie. reflecTies over De ToeKomsT van heT gronDweTTeliJK 
rechT in De gelaagDe rechTsorDe [The future of  Belgium. Reflections on the future of  constitutional law in a 
multilayered legal order] (2011) (pleading for either more federalism or a more firm democratization at 
the federal level, i.e., less extensive protection of  the French-speaking minority). Compare the observation 
of  Guy Peters, who, on the occasion of  the publication of  a special issue on Belgium of  the journal West 
European Politics, said that it was remarkable to note a number of  academics discuss “questions bordering 
on survival of  the system and the maintenance of  the system, rather than merely fine tuning and coping 
with more immediate policy problems.” See B. Guy Peters, Consociationalism, Corruption and Chocolate: 
Belgian Exceptionalism, 29 w. eur. Pol. 1079, 1080–1081 (2006).
43 John Pinder, Multinational Federations, in mulTinaTional feDeraTions 1, 9 (Michael Burges & John Pinder 
eds., 2007).
44 Lijphart, The Belgian Example, supra note 34, at 1.
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accommodation techniques. As it develops, consociationalism can harden or rigidify 
pre-existing group differences.46 At least two problems stand out.
The first can be found on the level of  political parties and elite estrangement. In 
a consociational democracy, Stephen Holmes has aptly observed, the political elites 
must both represent and not represent their constituencies: “They must hold their 
followers’ loyalty, but not reproduce their uncompromising attitudes in national nego-
tiations. Such cross-sectarian cooperation among elites requires ‘a strengthening of  
the political inertness of  the non-elite public and their deferential attitudes to the 
segmental leaders.’”47 The trouble is that in Belgium this seems hardly possible since 
national political parties no longer exist. Since the 1960s, Belgium has had regional 
political parties, and today, quite a few of  these parties have no ideological counterpart 
on the other side of  the language border. And even when they do (as is the case with 
the Christian-democratic, liberal, and social-democratic political parties) they are split 
on many important issues. Today, the discursive focus of  politics and of  public opin-
ion is almost exclusively geared towards the regional level and its sentiments. Federal 
politicians are first and foremost representatives of  their respective regions in which 
they are elected. This makes for a not necessarily Belgian minded political elite, with 
hardly any Belgian identity.48 All this has removed incentives for moderate consensual 
and electoral politics, and has resulted in a big gap between regional electoral pledges 
and the reality of  national politics. This gulf  has been widened by a split media land-
scape,49 and the fact that since the 1990s, it has been possible to form different or 
asymmetrical regional and federal government coalitions.50 Consociationalism asks 
that the language communities be willing and have the ability to compromise and 
reach consensus, but before that is possible, in Belgium, “elected politicians wanting 
to govern at the federal level must first solve the problems [among the language com-
munities] that they have created themselves.”51
46 Pildes, supra note 6, at 333.
47 sTePhen holmes, Passions anD consTrainT. on The Theory of liBeral Democracy 212 (1995) (referring to 
Lijphart). Peters describes this as follows: “The federal nature of  Belgian politics means that the party 
leaders must be thinking about their role in the context of  a multi-level governance arrangement, and 
must conceptualise their role as the cement that binds the various elements of  the system together.” Guy 
Peters, supra note 42, at 1081.
48 Deschouwer therefore talks about distrust at the top: the elite does not trust the system, because the politi-
cal system is perceived to benefit the other more. See Deschouwer, supra note 6, at 233.
49 Which, if  it even reports on this issue, gives a very one-sided and even partial account of  events and 
political life on the other side of  the language border. See David Sinardet & Martina Temmerman, Political 
Journalism Across the Language Border: Communicative Behaviour in Political Interviews by Dutch- and French-
speaking Journalists with Dutch- and French-speaking Politicians in Federal Belgium, in mulTilingualism anD 
aPPlieD comParaTive linguisTics. vol. 2: cross-culTural communicaTion, TranslaTion sTuDies anD mulTilingual 
Terminology 110 (Jeroen Darquennes ed., 2008).
50 Deschouwer, supra note 6, at 233–236; van goeThem, supra note 27, at 269–271. Guy Peters rather neu-
trally observes that “there is not necessarily a greater identification of  the public with Belgium as an 
entity than with the constituent parts.” He adds that the regions have become the arena in which the 
conflict between both parts of  Belgium are played out. See Guy Peters, supra note 42, at 1083–1084.
51 Deschouwer, supra note 6, at 237. I believe that this is the core of  one of  the main criticisms of  consociation-
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The second consociational fault line, which lines up to the first one in that both 
stimulate calls for more, in this case, Flemish autonomy (and in both cases the solu-
tions desired become part of  the problem for consociationalist theory and politics), has 
to do with the specificity of  Belgian federalism. Federalism is mostly intended to bring 
the separate units of  a state together.52 The Belgian variety of  federalism, however, has 
the exact opposite aim of  separating its two main components;53 Belgian federalism 
is thoroughly bipolar. While federalism tends to work well when there are more than 
two basically equal partners, “[Belgian federalism] is the juxtaposition of  two peoples 
moving in different directions.”54 As a result, social tensions among the groups can 
easily worsen, since “the problem” can always be traced to “the same other”:55 politi-
cal parties belong to one language group, as do members of  parliament (including 
the accompanying veto mechanisms), federal government is based on linguistic parity, 
etc. This is even more so since the rather far-reaching allocation of  competences to the 
Regions and Communities highlight the differences rather than the commonalities 
between the two main regions and language groups. To put it in financial terms, the 
fact that there are significant financial transfers from one economically solid region—
Flanders—to the economically less well off  region—Wallonia—has a profound impact 
on Flemish public opinion. Many would reason that the financing region should also 
have a more decisive say in the other’s state of  affairs and in their institutional and 
constitutional relations (i.e., how they relate to each other).56 However, as we have 
seen, decision-making on the future of  the Belgian state, including its financial allo-
cation mechanisms,57 always involves the other veto player who is perceived to be 
radically different. And since calls for more autonomy tend to come from the Dutch-
language part of  the country, this “other” is also a linguistic minority.
attitudes and behavior that promotes stability. Donald Horowitz, Constitutional Design: an Oxymoron?, in 
Designing DemocraTic insTiTuTions 253 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds., 2000); and Donald Horowitz, 
Constitutional Design: Proposals versus Processes, in The archiTecTure of Democracy. consTiTuTional Design, 
conflicT managemenT, anD Democracy 15 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002). For an excellent overview of  the 
debate between Lijphart and Horowitz, see Sujit Choudhry, Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative 
Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design in Divided Societies, in consTiTuTional Design for DiviDeD socieTies, 
supra note 6, 15. See also Rudy Andeweg, Consociational Democracy, 3 ann. rev. Pol. sci. 509 (2000).
52 Interestingly, Lijphart himself  seems to have recognized this:
  A multiple balance of  power among the segments of  a plural society is more conducive to consociational 
democracy than a dual balance of  power or hegemony by one of  the segments, because if  one segment 
has a clear majority its leaders may attempt to dominate rather than cooperate with the rival minority.
 See liJPharT, Democracy in Plural socieTies, supra note 34, 55.
53 Belgian federalism might have this in common with Canada or Spain, or possibly the United Kingdom 
(devolution).
54 As former Prime Minister Tindemans said in 1971: ParliamenTary ProceeDings, Senate (July 7, 1971) at 
2368.
55 Deschouwer, supra note 6, at 235.
56 van goeThem, supra note 27, at 271.
57 Which are not fully federalized: the division of  competences between the two Regions and Communities 
does not always come with the full fiscal autonomy necessary for employing these competences; the 
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In Belgium, the dynamics between institutional change and regional identity build-
ing seems to have a self-enforcing effect. Van Goethem points out that the growth of  
regional nationalism and awareness in Flanders and in Wallonia is constantly sub-
jected “to the renewing influence of  its own internal dynamic, so that the emotional 
element becomes stronger and stronger, almost in a kind of  permanent escalation.”58 
He suggests that the electoral reforms of  189359 sparked a development, in Flanders 
at least, from romantic nationalism to a hard political struggle for a monolingual and 
more autonomous Flanders. At the same time, this development hardened Walloon 
resistance against Flemish nationalism. What is important to note here is that an 
incremental development towards more demands for regional autonomy is embedded 
in this dynamic.60 The same is true of  the process of  federalization, which started off  
institutionally in 1970 and was introduced precisely to curb demands for more auton-
omy (or even separatism), but which seems to possess a virtually unstoppable devolu-
tional or centrifugal dynamic exactly towards (demands for) more autonomy. Today, 
the Regions and Communities have indeed developed into highly autonomous parts 
of  the country. The autonomy of  the Regions and Communities also explains why 
Belgium can go without a federal government for long periods of  time: governmental 
policy is to a considerable extent set and implemented by the sub-state governments 
and, not to forget, the European Union (with its headquarters in the Belgian capital, 
Brussels). Although this is certainly not an ideal situation, it does allow Belgium to 
survive federally with a so-called caretaker government.61 Thus understood, there is 
in Belgium less than optimal pressure to rapidly form a federal government—a state 
of  affairs that is moreover not improved by the fact that the consociational elites have 
delegated many functions of  government to semi-private segmental organizations 
(pillarization).62 In more general terms, institutional and constitutional patterns have 
reinforced more structural patterns; patterns that are not necessarily conducive to a 
consociationalist political culture.
The fault lines described and analyzed in this section provoke two questions about 
the status of  consociational theory. What is its value, and is Belgium (still?) a conso-
ciational democracy? To begin with the second question, it is clear that the rules of  the 
political game in Belgium are consociational: unilateral action and majoritarian deci-
sion-making between the language groups on issues of  state organization are in any 
case not legally possible. The ability to compromise is still the conditio sine qua non of  
Belgian politics and possibly even of  the continuation of  the Belgian state: the default 
58 van goeThem, supra note 27, at 255.
59 See supra Section 2.
60 Hooghe, supra note 41, at 36.
61 For example, during the caretaker administration of  2010–2011, an important agreement concerning a 
wage norm for employees was negotiated between the relevant actors (employers and employee organiza-
tions). On the caretaker government, see Carl Devos & Dave Sinardet, Governing without a Government: The 
Belgian Experiment, 25 governance: inT’l J. Pol’y, aDmin., & insTiTuTions 167 (2012); and Geert Bouckaert 
& Marleen Brans, Governing without Government: Lessons from Belgium’s Caretaker Government, 25 
governance: inT’l J. Pol’y, aDmin. & insTiTuTions 173 (2012).






/icon/article/12/2/279/710376 by guest on 14 August 2020
Disabling constitutionalism. Can the politics of  the Belgian Constitution be explained? 297
option is that there will be a profound crisis, and thus possibly no decision-making in 
any policy domain.63 The rules of  the political game are constitutionally defined and 
figure prominently in political discourse, especially, of  course, when the disagreement 
is on very fundamental issues of  state organization. In Belgium, the constitutional and 
institutional context thus seems crucial in determining how the country develops; the 
veto player has very powerful means at his disposal, and to date, state failure has not 
seemed to be an option for those politically in charge. The 1970 reforms—resulting in 
the constitutional fixation of  the language border, splitting up parliament in language 
groups and granting these groups veto rights, and other mechanisms by which a par-
liamentary majority can be blocked64—have been crucial in this respect.65 But there is 
also a creeping, built-in dynamic towards more autonomy that threatens the Belgian 
state from within. It seems, as I have tried to show, that Belgian consociationalism and 
federalism function as a self-fulfilling prophecy towards splitting up Belgium. Yet, it 
is also fair to say that Belgian consociational democracy continues to function. True, 
there have been a number of  deep crises as well as highly imaginative compromises 
(which explain the rather accidental and hybrid nature of  Belgium’s federalism and its 
Constitution), but it is precisely the fact that these compromises are reached that can 
be understood as proof  of  the political will to keep the system going.66
But how long will this situation last? “Prediction is difficult, especially concerning 
the future,” Niels Bohr reportedly once said. The complexity of  the Belgian situation 
makes any prediction an even more hazardous challenge than it normally is. From the 
perspective of  this article, the one million dollar question is whether Belgium’s consti-
tutional and institutional set-up is conducive to societal stability and peace (and in line 
with this: whether Belgium will survive its seemingly permanent political crisis). So far 
it seems as if  it has indeed been conducive to societal stability: Belgium is not marked 
by riots and violent uprisings between the different communities. And even the rela-
tive instability of  Belgian governments can be seen as systemically functional because 
governmental break-up might also be understood as one of  the means of  reducing the 
possibilities for political deadlock and blockage.67 Even so, there are indications that 
in Belgium consociational strategies can no longer be fully relied upon. For example, 
the cries for more autonomy have in recent years led to the rise of  a strong demo-
cratic nationalist political party in Flanders, the NV-A (Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie, the 
New Flemish Alliance), which is currently part of  the Flemish government coalition. 
The NV-A would appear to have replaced the more extremist and separatist right-wing 
63 Velaers, supra note 25, at 25. Also Kris Deschouwer, And the Peace Goes On? Consociational Democracy and 
Belgian Politics in the Twenty-First Century?, 29 w. eur. Pol. 895, 904 (2006); and Maarten Theo Jans, 
Leveled Domestic Politics. Comparing Institutional Reform and Ethnonational Conflicts in Canada and Belgium 
(1960–89) 4 res PuBlica 37 (2001). Although the most recent caretaker government was capable of  
functioning for quite a while. See supra text accompanying 61. My suggestion is that this is partly due to 
the economic crisis, which created an extraordinary situation.
64 See supra Section 2.
65 Deschouwer, supra note 63, at 903.
66 Id. at 903.
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Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) as the voters’ favorite nationalist political party; until 
recently, the latter did rather well in elections, but politically it has remained a mar-
ginal force because of  its xenophobic views and the resulting exclusion of  any govern-
ing coalition (cordon sanitaire).68 It is also at heart an opposition party. The current 
success of  the NV-A might be a sign of  a changing political constellation—separatism 
is becoming a real issue in political discourse; maintenance of  the status quo does not 
appear to be the only option any longer, at least not for the Flemish part of  the coun-
try, nor is it realistic, given the institutional and historical weaknesses of  the Belgian 
state.69 And although demands for more autonomy seem to come mainly from the 
Dutch-speaking side of  Belgium, these demands are highly relevant to the French-
speaking part. Previously, when tensions ran high and one of  the actors insisted on 
institutional reform, the other side perceived that as a quasi-obligation to negotiate a 
solution for the problem concerned.70 Today, however, the positions are hardening and 
some development towards an even more federalized system seems to be the unavoid-
able next step.
As far as the first question about the value of  consociational theory is concerned, it 
seems to me that it is at its strongest when it is understood as a descriptive, rather than 
explanatory, theory, i.e., if  we understand it as being descriptive of  a “fuzzy”71 state of  
affairs. As an explanatory theory, consociationalism is unclear as to why some elites 
opt for consociational techniques, and other elites for other techniques, to create soci-
etal stability. Consociational theory seems, moreover, to be tautological:
Consociationalism is defined by a deeply divided society and by elite cooperation; in other 
words, both the problem and the solution are part of  the definition. . . . To say that elite coop-
eration leads to political stability is almost the same as saying that there will be no fights in the 
playground when children stop quarreling (almost, because there still remains the possibil-
ity that the masses will revolt spontaneously against their cooperating leaders). In that sense, 
consociational democracy is not a theory of  cause and effect but rather a descriptive category 
defined by a problem, the reaction to the problem by political elites, and the consequences of  
that reaction.72
Logically, a desire to coalesce implies a need for it.73 So in light of  what has been said 
so far, we might well wonder why Belgium does not split up. The most convincing expla-
nation for the current situation is Brussels. There are at least two elements that are 
relevant here. The first is the economically vital position of  Brussels: it is a significant 
place of  employment for many people from outside of  Brussels. Breaking up comes at 
68 In 2004, some of  its satellite organizations were convicted for racist crimes. See Maurice Adams, Geen 
woorden maar daden? De vrije meningsuiting van het Vlaams Blok [Not Words, But Actions. Freedom of  
Opinion of  the Flemish Interest], rechTsfilosofie en rechTsTheorie 189 (2004).
69 van goeThem, supra note 27, 276.
70 Deschouwer, supra note 63, at 906.
71 Id. at 895–896 and 899 (Deschouwer also notes that the term consociationalism has been constantly 
taking on new meanings).
72 Andeweg, supra note 51, at 520 (referring to Barry).
73 As Lijphart himself  admits in Arend Lijphart, The Wave of  Power-Sharing Democracy, in The archiTecTure of 
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considerable cost, possibly too high to even seriously consider. The second element is 
the emotional element: although nowadays Brussels is essentially a French-speaking 
city, geographically surrounded by Flanders, historically it is of  Dutch-speaking ori-
gin. The Francization of  Brussels, which started in the mid-nineteenth century, is a 
“romantic” source of  frustration for many.74 “If  Flanders were not to claim or need 
Brussels, the structure of  Belgium could be much less complicated. Both communities 
see Brussels as their (capital) city and that is what has created the double federation 
of  Regions and Communities.”75 In the meantime, tensions continue to build, Flemish 
calls for more autonomy are growing stronger, and the willingness to federally cooper-
ate in a consensual manner seems to be losing ground.
6. Back to the Constitution
In Passions and Constraint, Stephen Holmes writes that a constitution disables political 
decision-making in that it sets up procedural roadblocks by, for example, introducing 
supermajority decision-making rules or by enacting bills of  rights; the idea is thereby 
to prevent tyranny and other abuses of  power.76 Holmes terms this “negative consti-
tutionalism.” In a divided society, as in any liberal society, constitutions must fulfill 
this negative or disabling role.77 A constitution at the same time can, according to 
Holmes, also assume an enabling role, which he calls “positive constitutionalism”: 
it can help create the very demos which governs itself  through the constitutional 
regime. In this sense, a state can also use its powers to achieve cooperation and sup-
port, rather than just compliance. Even stronger, in a divided democracy, negative 
and positive constitutionalism should be connected to each other. Choudhry puts it 
like this:
[B]ecause of  a history of  conflict or a lack of  shared existence, the constitution is often the 
principal vehicle for the forging of  a common political identity, which is, in turn, necessary to 
make that constitutional regime work. To some extent, the constitution can foster the develop-
ment of  a common political identity by creating institutional spaces for shared decision making 
among members of  different ethnocultural groups. Concrete experiences of  shared decision-
making within the framework of  the rule of  law, and without resource to force or fraud, can 
serve as the germ of  a nascent sense of  political community.78
I submit that, in Belgium, negative and positive constitutionalism are not connected 
and thus cannot be mutually reinforcing. Belgian constitutionalism does not succeed 
in taking up an enabling role. The Constitution itself  is at best a rational construction, 
possessing an accidental nature and a complex technicality; there is no clear Belgian 
project to be discovered in it, and it represents a form of  federalism that does not 
74 See also Section 1.
75 Deschouwer, supra note 6, at 244.
76 holmes, supra note 47, at xi–xiii, 5–7, and 161–164. Also Choudhry, supra note 51, at 5–6.
77 Choudhry, supra note 51, at 6.
78 Id. Choudhry adds that a constitution can “constitute a demos by encoding and projecting a certain 
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create any Belgian public space. More than anything else, the Belgian Constitution 
has institutionalized political distrust and instability. We might as well talk about 
disintegrating federalism. As a result, it has not been capable of  instilling a sense of  
nationhood—with mutual respect and common interests between the (populations of  
the) different communities—or Verfassungspariotismus in its nationals.79 The Belgian 
Constitution is an encumbering one, and the type of  decision-making it encourages 
can hardly serve as the “germ of  a nascent sense of  political community,” or promote 
the general interest beyond the regional interests.
All this raises more general questions of  a constitution’s endurance and norma-
tive value:80 under what conditions are political actors usually prepared to comply 
with constitutional requirements? Under what conditions can negative and positive 
constitutionalism be connected? The answer to these questions will depend on the 
socio-political environment a particular constitution is meant to serve, and on the 
integration of  that constitution into the society of  which it intends to be a part.81 In 
this vein, Richard Kay has recently written that the force of  any constitution ulti-
mately depends on it continuing to be acceptable over time to the real human beings 
whose lives it affects. That acceptability, Kay adds, will have two aspects: “First, some 
minimum part of  the relevant population must find the constitution’s substantive 
rules satisfactory, or at least tolerable. Second, that population must regard the con-
stitutional rules as having issued from a legitimate source.”82 In other words, there 
should be a general public willingness to accept the authority of  the constitution, 
regardless of  whether or not each of  its elements corresponds more or less with every 
person’s individual interest or point of  view of  how the state should be organized 
and work.
Kay’s anti-Weberian observation83 leaves open many pressing questions. How 
many people, for example, does it take to constitute the necessary minimum part of  
the relevant population in a liberal democracy? Whatever the concrete answer to 
these questions may be, I understand his observation as a mainly sociological one; 
claiming that the tension between the aspirations of  constitutional rules, on the one 
79 Koen Lemmens, De Belgische Grondwet, een model voor Europa? Over natie en identiteit [The Belgian 
Constitution; A model for Europe? About nation and indentity], rechTsfilosofie en rechTsTheorie 179, 185 
(2005). Elazar puts it like this: “Federalism can exist only where there is a considerable tolerance of  diver-
sity and willingness to take political action through the political arts of  negotiation even when the power 
to act unilaterally is available.” Daniel elazar, exPloring feDeralism 181 (1987).
80 On this normative role, see Karl loewensTein, PoliTical Power anD The governmenTal Process 147–148 
(1957): normative constitutionalism “focuses on the concordance of  the reality of  the power process 
with the norms of  the constitution. It proceeds from the recognition that a written constitution does not 
operate automatically once it has been adopted by a nation.” See also Dieter Grimm, Types of  Constitutions, 
in The oxforD hanDBooK of comParaTive consTiTuTional law 98, 107 (Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajό 
eds., 2012).
81 loewensTein, supra note 80, 148.
82 Richard Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 am. J. comP. l. 715, 756 (2011). Cf. Choudhry, supra note 51, at 
6–7.
83 In the sense that it runs counter to Max Weber’s view that the formal-rational character of  law could be 
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hand, and their capacity to affect political reality, on the other, must be constrained 
if  the constitution is to play a normative or real role. And then, it is important to 
note that the two conditioning features Kay identifies for a constitution to possess 
“constitutional force” are, at least in Dutch-speaking Belgium, in steady decline. As 
I have tried to show in this article, the Belgian Constitution does play a significant 
role in channeling and/or constraining the local politico-institutional situation. But 
this comes at great emotional cost, and at least in Flanders there appears to be limited 
support for the Belgian construct as it is established by its Constitution.84 The Belgian 
Constitution today reflects a status quo, has hardly any expressive or aspirational 
role85 to play, and is deficient in its positive or enabling function and in generating 
general public support.
This is a problematic state of  affairs, since partition and secession, which might 
be the result of  all this, usually comes with an array of  negative consequences, the 
possibility of  violence being one of  them.86 So, although there is no right or objective 
answer to the question why Belgium should continue to exist, there are nevertheless 
reasons to try to foster moderation and cooperation between the communities and its 
politicians. One way of  doing this is by means of  electoral systems. “If  election depends, 
at the margin, on the ability to gain some votes from members of  groups other than 
one’s own, then political leaders will behave in an ethnically conciliatory fashion for 
that purpose. One thing we know is that politicians like being elected and reelected. If  
consociational theory provides no motive for compromise behavior, incentive theory, 
by definition, does not share that defect,” Horowitz writes.87 One could, for example, 
(re)introduce a federal electoral district for the federal parliament, which should cre-
ate incentives for political parties to cross internal linguistic borders and be able to 
achieve a stronger kind of  political integration within Belgium and a better developed 
federal public sphere.88
84 Hence also the many pleas and proposals for a Flemish “Constitution,” and this for many years already. 
As can be imagined, these proposals are fiercely debated, even among those sympathetic to such a project. 
Most recently, in May 2012, a resolution for a Charter for Flanders was proposed in Flemish Parliament 
by the three political parties that also participate in the Flemish government coalition. See Handvest Voor 
Vlaanderen, http://docs.vlaamsparlement.be/docs/biblio/opendigibib/monografie/2012/280_hand-
vest_voor_vlaanderen_20120524.pdf  (only in Dutch). This Charter is a collection of  existing provisions, 
stemming from, e.g., the Belgian Constitution and the European Charter, and has no legal value. It has yet 
to be put to the vote, but the mere fact of  it being proposed (by the parties forming Flemish government 
moreover) of  course has political significance.
85 Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Dimension of  Law, 144 u. Pa. l.  rev. 2012 (1995–1996) and The 
imPorTance of iDeals: DeBaTing Their relevance in law, moraliTy, anD PoliTics esp. 11–38 (Wibren van der 
Burg & Sanne Taekema eds., 2004).
86 See Donald Horowitz, The Cracked Foundations of  the Right to Secede, 14 J. Democracy 5 (2003–2002).
87 Id. at 15.
88 Dave Sinardet, Direct Democracy as a Tool to Shape a United Public Opinion in a Multilingual Society? Some 
Reflections Based on the Belgian Case, in PuBlic oPinion in a mulTilingual socieTy insTiTuTional Design anD 
feDeral loyalTy 34, 39–41 (Dave Sinardet & Marc Hooghe eds., 2009). About this, see Donald Horowitz, 
A Federal Constituency for Belgium: Right Idea, Inadequate Method, in elecToral engineering for a sTalleD 
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7. Final observations
I do not think that there exists an objective set of  rules for matching a people and 
their situation with a set of  institutions, nor is there an inherently stable or objectively 
superior constitutional system.89 The Belgian case can nevertheless be instructive in 
telling us a bit more about the constitutional conditions that are at least, if  nothing 
else, not antagonistic to societal stability (or possibly even conducive to it). It seems as 
if  the Belgian Constitution is developing into a nominal constitution: i.e., a constitu-
tion that lacks existential reality.90 Loewenstein compares this to a badly tailored suit, 
but in the Belgian case, it might be better to talk about a worn out suit. In any case, 
a constitution like the Belgian one is in danger of  no longer being able to govern the 
dynamics of  the power process and becomes, instead, governed by it:91 a warning of  
the demise of  a state’s capacity to effectively act as the agent of  its citizens’ well being.
In such conditions, the Constitution runs the risk of  losing its legitimacy and fall-
ing prey to political manipulation. Consociationalism à la Belgique does not seem to 
have been able to prevent this development, and has possibly even stimulated it. At the 
end of  the day, this is a problematic state of  affairs because democratic politics with-
out the normative leverage of  a constitution is powerless. No democracy can survive 
such a state of  affairs.92 It is therefore not enough to have an idea about what role the 
Belgian Constitution still plays in channeling and/or constraining the local politico-
institutional situation (i.e., the research question this article started with). It is just as 
important to know under what conditions a constitution can function as a normative 
document. The thesis proposed in this article is that there should at least be a connec-
tion between what is being called negative and positive constitutionalism, and that 
Belgium might benefit from installing political incentives to encourage moderation 
between the communities and its politicians.
89 DonalD luTz, PrinciPles of consTiTuTional Design, at ix (2006). Loewenstein also discards the idea of  try-
ing to devise a “perfect theoretical constitution,” instead claiming that “an ideal constitution has never 
existed, and will never exist.” loewensTein, supra note 80. This brings to mind Aristotle’s well-known 
observation that “[t]he attainment of  the best constitution is likely to be impossible for the general run 
of  states; and the good law-giver and the true statesman must therefore have their eyes open not only to 
what is the absolute best, but also to what is the best in relation to actual conditions.” See Aristotle, The 
Politics 134 (Bk IV, 1288b21) (Ernest Barker & Richard Stalley trans., 1998).
90 loewensTein, supra note 80, at 148–149. Nominal constitutions, so Loewenstein asserts, find their limits 
in the given power structures, political as well as economical.
91 Id. at 149. The Belgian political sociologist Huyse noted more or less the same in the wake of  the signifi-
cant institutional crisis in Belgium in the middle of  the 1990s, which was sparked by the high-profile 
criminal case against Marc Dutroux (the perverse murderer of  a number of  Belgian children): Luc huyse, 
De lange weg naar neufchâTeau [The Long Road to Neufchâteau] 7 and 192 (1996).
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